By the time Baker got back to Washington, he had spent 36 days out of the last 70 shuttling in the Middle East. Some of his top appointees groused that crises brewing elsewhere were getting scant attention. The peace process was stalled and there was no guarantee that more weeks, months, even years would get it going. The moment may have come to ask, if the Middle Eastern parties are willing to give so little for peace, should the United States give so much?
Washington’s European allies, its Arab friends and many of Israel’s supporters will say yes. They will argue for patience. Bush and Baker, seeing that other elements of their postwar vision for the region haven’t come true, may be reluctant to write off this effort as a bust. But what if it is? I U.S. security threatened if Israel and its Arab neighbors don’t make peace? The answer used to be yes, certainly, for solid geostrategic reasons. That’s no longer the case.
During 40 years of East-West hostility, Washington feared that a confrontation between Israel and the Arabs could escalate into a conflict between the two superpowers. But now Washington and Moscow are cooperating rather than contending on most Mideast issues.
Access to oil was another traditional concern. Conventional wisdom held that America’s emotional support for Israel and the Arab states’ emotional support for the Palestinians was a volatile mix that could lead to a cutoff of Arab oil. But the gulf states’ passion for Palestinian rights evaporated with the Palestinians’ support for Iraq, and these states now have bound their security to the United States more tightly than ever.
The process of peacemaking, successful or not, used to give the United States clout, since both Arabs and Israelis looked to Washington as the broker. Washington jealously guarded the role. But with the United States now the world’s only remaining superpower, no country can rival it for influence in the Middle East, whatever the state of play may be. “It’s hard to argue now that America’s strategic interests are threatened by the lack of a peace process,” says Martin Indyk, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Still, Baker seems inclined to persevere. Whether successful or not, argues one White House official, going through the motions can be worthwhile in this explosive region. “A phony peace process can help manage a conflict until the combatants are actually ready to resolve it,” says the official. Fair enough, But neither Baker nor Bush are needed for that.
