After a few months at the very top of Russian politics, Putin is still a mystery. To find out what kind of president he might be, experts look for clues in his statements and interviews. But there are few answers–and Putin does not know them himself. Until very recently he did not set his ambitions on becoming Russia’s president, and even today he does not possess a coherent set of political beliefs to implement while in office.
There are several scenarios for what Putin might be like as president:
The strongman. There is a growing fear among the liberal Russian intelligentsia that Putin may become a dictator, curtailing the hard-won political liberties of the last few years. Putin does not hesitate to take ruthless decisions, as he has done in the war in Chechnya. He pays lip service to freedom of the press, but his treatment of Andrei Babitsky, the reporter from Radio Liberty abused by Russian secret services for his reporting from Chechnya, sends a chilling signal to the journalistic community. Appealing to popular demands to turn back the chaos in Russia, Putin uses every opportunity to show that he wants to re-establish order by any means. In the higher echelons of Russian politics, the number of graduates from the secret services is growing–and so is a concern about the return to repressive practices of the past.
The hostage. Putin could be pulled by irreconcilable vested interests. Diehard proponents of the Soviet-style economy expect him to revive the military-industrial complex and pour resources into derelict industries. Members of Russia’s nascent middle class hope he will boost reforms to increase their level of consumption. Insatiable elites are competing for increasing shares of economic resources and political influence. It remains unclear whether Putin would be able to put these warring factions under his control–or fall victim to their egoistic appetites. Putin might be like Gorbachev, who initially enjoyed enormous popular support but soon became a hostage to his own divided and incompetent team and was roundly defeated a few years later.
The opportunist. The war in Chechnya demonstrates Putin’s eagerness to exploit a political opportunity rather than implement a well-thought-out political plan. For years the Russian people felt humiliated by the defeat in the 1994-96 Chechen war and the decline in Russian military power. During the war in Kosovo, when a Russian battalion marched to Pristina ahead of NATO troops and seized the local airport, it triggered a huge celebration in Russia.
It became clear that the wounds inflicted by Russia’s defeat in Chechnya a few years ago had to be cured by a massive dose of military force. At the outset of the second conflict in Chechnya, the Russian public took satisfaction in televised images of advancing Russian troops and Chechen strongholds’ being destroyed. These images fueled Putin’s popularity and restored a sense of national self-confidence. If there is a more peaceful approach to Chechnya, Putin may well be saving it for a more opportune time.
Putin is also aware of a disillusionment with the West after years of Western involvement in painful and often unsuccessful reforms. Exploiting these sentiments, he sometimes sounds less than friendly in his approach toward the West. At the same time, he has talked publicly about possible Russian membership in NATO. He belongs to a generation of the Russian elite that participated in the end of the cold war and he is not inclined to restart this no-win competition.
The economic pragmatist. Putin does not have an economic agenda of his own and may be inclined to marriages of convenience in this sphere. Listening to all kinds of experts, Putin would try to choose solutions that might seem most efficient. But because he does not have a coherent team of advisers at the moment, this approach may result in poorly coordinated decisions. Many reform advocates have been discredited in the last few years, and Putin may try to give more power to proponents of state regulation. But it is doubtful they could suggest realistic solutions to Russia’s economic ills.
In Russian fairy tales, the hero usually disregards the doomsaying road signs and manages to escape the perils they announce. Such fatalistic optimism may explain Russian voters’ willingness to put enormous power into the hands of a man who seems good at turning challenges into opportunities. And it may also explain Vladimir Putin’s own confidence in his ability to deliver.
Malashenko is a political strategist with Media Most, which publishes the weekly magazine Itogi in cooperation with NEWSWEEK.
